



# Community Safety



**SAFETY MATTERS**  
**SIGURIA MBITË GJITHA**  
**SIGURNOST PRE SVEGA**

# Community Safety

**Anna Di Lellio**

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## Executive Summary and Recommendations

The Kosovo Early Warning System Project has been tracking and analyzing trends, through the monitoring of key security indicators, since 2001. Its aim is to develop the capacity to foresee potential threats and recommend preventive measures. This edition of the EWS is intended to provide an assessment of community safety from a human security perspective, with a focus on “people-centered” security and sensitivity to a gender-based approach. It has been prepared in the context of the ongoing development of safety councils in municipalities and villages, and an emerging local safety strategy that rests on partnerships between the police, local government and agencies, and citizens.

The report presents findings from a survey conducted in December 2008 (See Appendix), which was designed to gauge perceptions of local safety and of institutional responses to threats across a broad spectrum of the Kosovo population. It also benefits from insights into opinion trends; internal security sector analyses and best practices; and lessons learned from Kosovo and elsewhere, which are provided by a substantial literature in the field. On this basis, the report offers recommendations for an internal safety strategy.

Survey data are the “local knowledge” that fundamentally guides the analysis. They show a mixed picture of opinions on safety matters, with two major issues in the foreground.

First, a general feeling of safety and trust in institutions is contradicted by a perception of local insecurity, which is driven both by a broad range of problems, and the sense that institutions – whether core security or civilian – are not as effective as they should be. Kosovo Serbs, who feel least safe in general, agree with the rest of the population on fundamental concerns with local security. In other words, it is at the local level, where shared concerns are, that the possibility of convergence is greatest in this ethnically divided society.

Second, it appears that for lack of improvement in the security situation, people in Kosovo still think that now is not the time to surrender their weapons. Yet, this disposition to treat safety as a private matter is accompanied by a stronger disposition, common across ethnic groups and gender, to join participatory safety initiatives alternative to policing: turning the individual engagement into civic activity is a real possibility.

The report draws from these potentials for local partnerships – among people, of people with the police, local governments and agencies - to propose ideas for a local safety strategy that follows the philosophy of human security and community policing. Both approaches are people-centered and sensitive to the local social, cultural and physical environment; they take a zero tolerance approach toward crime and the deterioration of quality of life. A full implementation of these principles will obtain two related outcomes: it will improve security, and establish a stronger civic sense of community, dispelling the confusion created by the overlapping of different perceptions and understandings of community(ies).

### More concretely the report recommends:

- **Responding to perceptions of threats coming from environmental problems – road safety and garbage collection first among them – through a more effective delivery of public services by local governments and agencies.** The police should also contribute to this goal, with both a preventive strategy and a stricter enforcement of environmental laws.
- **Building on citizens’ willingness to participate in safety initiatives, with the objective of establishing a closer relationship between them and the police, and thus increasing the accuracy of crime reporting.** Improved information on crime will contribute to police effectiveness and in turn increase trust in the police.


- **Following a gender-based perspective on the information gap on crime, by taking domestic violence as a priority.** This is a grossly underreported crime that victimizes the most vulnerable groups: women, girls and boys. Security and political institutions, together with civil society organizations, should involve those groups in conducting better research and information on domestic violence, as well as design and implementation of safety policies. The bet is that by taking an active role, vulnerable groups will reverse their victimization, but also shake local complacency toward crime.
- **Taking a broad approach to arms control, by responding to specific local needs that make people believe they must keep their weapons.** A gender-based perspective, beyond stereotypes, will also be useful in this context. Women, who feel more vulnerable and more dependent on the private sphere for protection, appear to be part of the decision making on weapons possession in significant ways. They could be very important in any arms control strategy.
- **Ensuring that community policing is accepted and practiced across all departments of Kosovo Police.** As the most effective local safety policy to date, community policing - a proactive strategy based on a partnership with local government and citizens – needs mainstreaming in the police work.
- **Improving the relationship between citizens and institutions, by training officers and official representatives in negotiation and conflict resolution techniques.** The advantage of such approach is clearly that it will help avoid confrontation with law enforcement institutions. It will do so, by building on the large reservoir of local knowledge of, and trust in, existing social mechanisms for regulating individual and group conflict.
- **Ensuring that the European Union Rule-of-Law Mission (EULEX) establish a relationship of trust with citizens, by setting clear and public benchmarks for its mandated work on improving the justice system.** This latter is the security institution that obtains the lowest rates of approval and trust, perceptions that match a reality of mismanagement and grave flaws.
- **Implementing Municipal Community Safety Councils (MCSCs) and Local Public Safety Committees (LPSCs) not simply as a forum for discrete groups – whether ethnic or social – to report their issues, but as dynamic centers that produce preventive, proactive local safety policy planning.** These councils should have a coordinating function for a broad range of community members who take the safety of all citizens as their priority.
- **Encouraging Mayors, who have been provided recently with expanded powers, to take the lead in embracing a philosophy of safety that is centered on efficiency in delivering public services and a sense of civic community.** They can promote partnerships between local associations among themselves and with the Municipality; they can coordinate the work of local agencies; they can provide leadership to other public service officials; and they can ensure that the safety issues addressed are relevant to all in the community, and not to the strongest, or the best lobbyists.

## Chapter I. Perceptions and reality of local safety

### General Feeling of Safety and Exceptions

According to the opinions gathered in our survey, there should be every reason to be satisfied with the safety of Kosovo's local societies. In large part, people in Kosovo feel safe and perceive their towns and villages as safe (Table 1).<sup>1</sup> The police, seen as the institution most responsible for local safety, enjoy growing trust among the population: it ranks first for effectiveness, when compared with others (Table 2).

**Table 1** Feeling of Personal Safety and Safety of Municipality/Village



Yet, behind this apparent rosy picture, there are contradictory signals, regarding both perceptions and reality. From survey data, corroborated by trends measured by Early Warning Reports and other studies, a citizenry emerges that is anxious about many problems, from poverty and unemployment to crime.<sup>2</sup> It is possible then that the sense of safety expressed by the vast majority of respondents might not refer to a true judgment about security in their local societies. Instead, it can be better understood in relation to a more general feeling of safety, following the settlement of the political status of Kosovo in February 2008, with the declaration of independence.<sup>3</sup>


<sup>1</sup> Throughout this reports "local society" connotes "municipality or village," the terms that the questionnaire uses in connection with individual and collective safety. Local society is better suited in this regard than "community," a word charged with different meanings (we will discuss this later), and introduced only in specific sections of the questionnaire.

<sup>2</sup> See the series of Early Warning Reports; Forum for Civic Initiative (FIQ) and Saferworld. Policing in Kosovo (February 2008) and Human Security in Kosovo. A Survey of Perceptions (May 2007).

<sup>3</sup> In 2007, anxiety about the resolution of Kosovo's final status and frustration over delays in its resolution were identified as drivers of insecurity and conflict in a study by Forum for Civic Initiatives (FIQ) and Saferworld, Kosovo at the Crossroads. Perceptions of conflict, access to justice and opportunities for peace in Kosovo (December 2007), pp. 13-15. After the riots of March 2004, the report A Comprehensive Review of the Situation In Kosovo, by UN Special Envoy Kai Eide found that a "sense of stagnation and the tense relationship between the Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs led to the outbreak of violence" and concluded that addressing the question of the future status of Kosovo should not be delayed much longer. The risks that would follow from a continued wait and see policy in terms of increasing political, economic and social frustration could soon be far greater than the risks related to a future status process. See p. 7, Annex to the Letter dated 7 October 2005 from the Secretary General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2006/635.




**Table 2** Perceptions of the Effectiveness of Institutions in Making Local Societies Safe



The group that admits to feeling least safe is in fact the Kosovo Serbian population (Table 3), the same that has not partaken in the consensus on Kosovo’s independence, and has opted out of the Kosovo Constitutional framework.<sup>4</sup> The predicament of Serbs in Kosovo deserves a separate and more in depth discussion later.

**Table 3** Feeling of Personal Safety and Safety of Municipality/Village by Ethnic Group




### Most Problems are Local

When asked about problems in their municipalities, Kosovars identify criminal activities as a major concern (Table 4). Half or more of the respondents assimilate corruption, thefts, robberies, alcohol abuse, drugs, and armed violence with local problems or serious problems. Organized crime, murder, vandalism, harassment, intimidation, celebratory fire, prostitution, violence in school, interethnic violence, blood feuds and domestic violence follow in this order; in each case they concern a third or more of the respondents.

This means that a large part of the population takes notice of activities involving close contact with criminal individuals or groups that in varying degrees upset their sense of safety. Among these activities, violent crime is a serious concern, and weapons, often associated with crime, contribute to the perception of insecurity. From this data we also learn indirectly that a broad section of respondents perceive weapons as a threat to safety, an acknowledgement that is relevant to any discussion on arms control strategies, as we will see later.

<sup>4</sup> Even before the declaration of independence, perceptions of safety linked to Kosovo’s status were wildly divergent between Albanians and Serbs. A 2007 survey showed that the resolution of Kosovo’s status would have meant an improvement in security for 73.2% of Albanians, but worsening of security for 78.2% of Serbs. See Human Security, *ibid.*, p. 21.

**Table 4** Issues Considered a Serious Problem or a Problem in the Municipality/Village

The recognition that worries of a different type, such as unemployment, poverty, garbage collection and road safety, are considered problems as serious as crime, further challenges the initial impression of largely safe local societies. It would be a mistake to think that these problems are disjoint from security, or pay lip service to their importance, while considering them “soft,” as opposed to the “hard” reality of crime. Economic and environmental problems in general create an atmosphere of insecurity, and we already know that this is the case in Kosovo from independent research – among others, the wide consultation preceding the internal security sector review.<sup>5</sup> Since that review, two shifts in perception have occurred and are worth noting here: pessimism about the economy has increased, and so the belief that domestic, not international institutions, are responsible for the economic situation.<sup>6</sup>

In considering perceptions of insecurity, we should not discount the influence of media on opinions -- through sensationalist headlines, a news cycle determined by the political calendar, or the basic philosophy of the trade that only bad news is news. Yet, all the above problems are not just about perception.

Poverty and unemployment are measurable, and their rates high: 40% of the population live in poverty and unemployment is at 45%; all other major micro-economic indicators are very negative.<sup>7</sup> Perceptions of economic insecurity will not decrease as long as the economy will not improve, an outcome that requires efforts at the level of Kosovo government as well as international institutions and donors.

**Table 5.** Fatalities in Traffic Incidents 2007 Sources: KP and UNECE

	Fatalities	Rate per 100,000
Kosovo*	194	9.7
FYROM	173	8.5
Bosnia and Herzegovina	236	5.4

\*Kosovo figures include all fatalities, including pedestrians

<sup>5</sup> An internal security sector review (ISSR) was launched in early 2006 upon the recommendation of the British Security Sector Development Advisory Team (SSDAT), and with the endorsement of the Special Representative of the Secretary General Soren Jesen Peterson, the Prime Minister and the President of Kosovo. An ISSR Secretariat, headed by British General Anthony Welch, managed the review process. See for KIPRED. Kosovo's Internal Security Sector Review. Stages I & II. Strategic Environment Review and Security Threat Analysis (March 2006), and Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review (2006).

<sup>6</sup> See Early Warning Report No. 24, April 2009.

<sup>7</sup> For a recent good summary review of the current economic situation see Vedran Dzihic and Helmut Kramer, Kosovo After Independence (July 2009), Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Report, especially pp. 10-12

Road safety is also quantifiable with some accuracy, but differently from the economy its management is local. With a rate of 9.7 fatalities (per 100,000) in traffic incidents, Kosovo ranks higher than neighboring Bosnia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Table 5).<sup>8</sup> Even more significantly, in the years 2006-2007, the number of hit and runs and injured persons increased by about 30%. These figures confirm that the anxiety about road safety among Kosovars is well justified and should raise the awareness of a serious problem in need for solutions.

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<sup>8</sup> See Kosovo Police (KP), Annual Report 2007, p. 16, and United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Transport Division, Main Transport Indicators in the UNECE Region 2007

## Chapter II. The Nuts and Bolts of Human Security

### **Fixing the Local Environment as a Security Strategy**

Road safety, like other environmental problems such as garbage collection, can be addressed only partially by law enforcement, and certainly not through traditionally reactive strategies.<sup>9</sup> There is a need for a more pro-active approach; the expansion of the actors involved in safety strategies, beside the police, to include local institutions; and the redirection of these strategies towards the improvement of basic services (among others street signs and lighting in this case), as well as other quality of life issues such as garbage collection and streets cleaning.

A betterment of the physical and social environment in Kosovo local societies will reduce the feeling of insecurity. It might act also as a deterrent to major crime, as the “broken window” theory has long advocated. If a town, a village or a neighborhood, are unkempt and generally poorly served; if their streets are dark and dangerous, the message is that nobody cares. If nobody cares, problems tend to escalate, for example garbage strewn in the streets increases and so do people’s anxiety. The same can be said of smaller offenses such as alcohol abuse, vandalism, harassment and school violence, which more often translate in disorderly behavior rather than violent crime, but nevertheless create a context of lawlessness. The police, in partnership with citizens, municipal institutions and agencies, should appropriately, but firmly tackle them, in order to reduce the citizens’ sense of loss of control over their local space. This realization is at the basis of community policing, which will be explained later.

#### **Broken Windows and Safety**

*The now classic “broken window” approach was first proposed by the American sociologists James Wilson and George Kelling in “Broken Windows: the Police and Neighborhood Safety” (The Atlantic Monthly, March 1982). It argues that fixing environmental problems when they are small and controlling anti-social behavior and petty crime acts as a deterrent to crime in general, in particular prevents major crime. This last conclusion is still contested, but there is no doubt that a broad understanding of “broken window theory,” with its focus on “zero tolerance,” “quality of life,” and “community policing” has gained wide recognition in the United States and around the world.*

*In particular, this approach has been linked to the drastic reduction of the crime rate in New York City during the 1990s. Its best-known practitioner, Commissioner William Bratton, has more recently achieved impressive results in reducing crimes rates, while breaching the very problematic relationship between the Los Angeles police and this city’s minorities.*

### **Measuring Crime More Accurately to Increase Trust**

Matching a general perception of violent crime with its reality in Kosovo is more complex than matching road safety perception with traffic incidents statistics, but not less conclusive. The last comparable police data show that during the period 2006-2007 violent crimes against persons, including robbery, sexual

<sup>9</sup> See the analysis of police work and shortcomings on this issue in Police Inspectorate of Kosovo, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Annual Report 2007. A Detailed Report on Police Performance (2008), pp. 44 ff.

and physical assault, have sharply increased (Table 6).<sup>10</sup> While the overall number of crimes remains largely consistent, it is still high.<sup>11</sup> The rate of crimes against society (+25%), as well as murder, which at 3.25 is already high, is also up.<sup>12</sup> These changes back up the awareness of crime as a serious problem.

**Table 6.** Violent Crime Against Persons 2006-2007 Source: KP

	2006	2007	Percentage +/-
Serious Assault	389	2882	+641
Sexual Assault	58	93	+60
Robbery	441	458	+4

Given that many offenses often go unreported, the reality might be even worse. In our survey, half of the respondents say that they always report crimes, with 28% indicating that they report crimes only sometimes. The phenomenon of crime underreporting, more severe in the countries of South Eastern Europe than the rest of Europe, is not unique to Kosovo,<sup>13</sup> and denotes both a symptom and a cause of problems with police effectiveness.

The capacity for planning safety strategies that target local and specific needs is built on accurate measurement of crime. Regional variations in reporting detected in our survey,<sup>14</sup> for example, might hinder the capacity of producing a truer map of crime, and consequently a rational and effective deployment of resources and personnel. The link between crime statistics and police operation is considered crucial in policing best practices, as the success of “CompStats” (statistics comparatively used to map crime, identify problems and create performance baselines) demonstrated in New York City and elsewhere.

Accurate data also provide the public with a clearer assessment of real threats at the local level and the actions taken in response. In other words, improved information on crime will contribute to police effectiveness and in turn increase the trust necessary to improving the rate of crime reporting, and cooperation with law enforcement in general. If bridging the gap between actual victimization and crime reporting is a strategic priority, one of the immediate steps that must be taken is the production of research that is better designed to obtain accurate, representative and comprehensive measurement of crime.

<sup>10</sup> See Kosovo Police, Annual Report 2007, pp. 22-23. In 2008 the police changed the classification of certain crimes, making statistical comparison difficult, if not impossible. We notice here that according to police statistics published in 2008, the number of violent “attacks against persons and life” is increased by 14% (See Annual Report 2008, p. 16). A recent report by EULEX points to this change as an impediment to the collection of reliable information about trends. See EULEX Programme Report (July 2009). The overall violent crime rate is 174, much higher than the Republic of Macedonia (51) but lower than Montenegro (1535) and Croatia (288). For a comparison with EU countries or EU candidate countries, see: [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/crime/documents/violent\\_crime.pdf](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/crime/documents/violent_crime.pdf)

<sup>11</sup> In 2007 Kosovo crime rate (measured as number of crimes per 100,000) was 3.044 compared with Macedonia 1,311, and Croatia 1,685. Only Montenegro has a much higher rate, with 4,629. For a comparison of Kosovo overall crime rate with EU countries or EU candidate countries, see: [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/crime/documents/total\\_crime.pdf](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/crime/documents/total_crime.pdf)

<sup>12</sup> In 2008, a year which is not part of this comparison, the number of murders went down to 55, or to the rate of 2.75. For a comparison of murder rates, see: <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/crime/documents/homicide.pdf>

<sup>13</sup> On this see United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Crime and Its Impact on the Balkans and Affected Countries, March 2008, p. 9. Of course the data that we have obtained here are only based on voluntary information. To have a better picture of the problem of underreporting, we would have to survey people who have been victimized, and who are then asked whether or not they reported their victimization to the police. Research that takes this into consideration (see EULEX Programme Report, p. 21) shows that in many EU countries while car thefts are usually reported, only 1/3 of assaults and threats are reported to the police, and sexual incidents are the least frequently reported (15%).

<sup>14</sup> In Prishtina, Gjakova and Gjilan, respondents said they were more likely to always report crime than those from other regions.

## ***A gender perspective on the information gap. A Tipping Point?***

As a case in point, better information and greater awareness will break the conspiracy of silence surrounding the crime of domestic violence, with positive consequence for local safety overall. Domestic violence everywhere mostly affects women, but not only because boys and girls are also involved; it occurs at home; it is grossly underreported; and is not investigated vigorously and effectively enough, perpetuating both victimization and a sense of police's inability or unwillingness to offer protection.

There is a worrisome discrepancy here between the reality and police statistics. Cases of domestic violence investigated by the Kosovo police in 2007 were fewer than in 2006 (1077 instead than 1371),<sup>15</sup> but there is no reason to believe that the problem is subsiding, or that the above figures, not disaggregated by sex, are an accurate representation of the depth and scope of reality. From the first comprehensive and independent research on this issue we know that the incidence of domestic violence is quite significant in Kosovo, with 46% of women having experienced violence at home.<sup>16</sup> Less known or publicized, the high number of males (39.6%) who have experienced violence at home doesn't even appear in crime statistics.<sup>17</sup> In addition, the connection of domestic violence with prostitution and trafficking does not seem to be taken into serious consideration, as it should be, because a number of victims of these crimes are minors from Kosovo.<sup>18</sup>

### ***Gender-Based Perspective and Security***

*The gender-based perspective is a well-established component of a human security approach to the security sector reform, on which there is a growing consensus. The security sector comprises state and non-state actors engaged in providing security and in oversight activities; its beneficiaries are the individuals.*

*Gender refers to learned differences between men and women and should not be confused with sex, or the biological difference between males and females.*

*A gender perspective is understood as a strategy that addresses the vulnerabilities of women, men, girls and boys, as well as the resources and the strategies available to them for their own security. The idea is that violence is gendered, and that together with power inequality creates pervasive insecurity, with widespread negative effects on the entire society.*

*See: Megan Bastick and Kristin Valasek (eds.) Gender & Security Sector Reform Toolkit. DCAF, OSCE/ODHIR, UN-INSTRAW*

Our survey shows that there is some awareness of domestic violence, but not as a priority: only 30% of the respondents claim that this crime is a problem or a serious problem in their towns or villages, putting it at the bottom of all possible economic, environmental and safety concerns. The percentage of people who admit to having been involved in a physical fight or argument with their partners or being physically abused by their partners at least once or several times seems too low (respectively 9.3% and 4%), compared with the information gathered from the more in depth investigation mentioned above.

<sup>15</sup> Annual Report 2007, p. 24.

<sup>16</sup> Nicole Farnsworth and Ariana Qosaj-Mustafa for the Kosovo's Women Network, Security Begins at Home. *Research to Inform the First National Strategy and Action Plan against Domestic Violence in Kosovo*, 2008, p. 28


<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>18</sup> Annual Report 2007, p. 27: 7 of the 18 Kosovar victims of trafficking in 2007 were under 18.

Research and data on domestic violence need to improve, and with them the awareness of the police and the general public. The Kosovo Police has a domestic violence and anti-trafficking unit, and receive basic gender awareness training. However, women and women’s organizations are better positioned to achieve good results in this field, in cooperation with core security and civilian institutions that work on abuse and violence against vulnerable subjects. Public campaigns against domestic violence organized since 2000 by women groups have had already an impact in increasing the rate of reporting.<sup>19</sup> Some suggestions about further initiatives: the establishment of a central hotline where domestic violence can be anonymously reported; the training of health care personnel, particularly mid-wives and pediatricians, in gathering information on abuse and violence; the enrollment of academics and researchers in scouting the problem and designing responses, including interventions in schools to change the way gender roles are seen by the younger generations, but not only; and the employment of home-grown conflict resolution and mediation techniques to recreate a balance in distraught households, without penalizing the weaker party.

Cooperation already exists among agencies, women groups, and researchers, on specific projects, beyond straightforward police interventions. They must become less episodic and must be able to count on stronger support from institutions and donors. A case in point are the existing underfinanced shelters and safe houses, now organized in the Kosova Coalition Against Family and Sexual Violence, whose lobbying efforts should be rewarded, within the context of a pro-active safety strategy.


**Table 7** Identification of Major Security Providers by Gender



Such cooperation is possible, but needs to be built, because our survey shows that women seem to be less reliant than men on institutional security providers such as the police and government (Table 7). They associate much more than men the private sphere of family and home with a sense of safety (Table 8). This phenomenon has a doubly negative impact: it makes them all the more vulnerable to domestic violence; and it diminishes the local capital of trust on which the police and other institutions must count, by excluding a large and important section of the population from cooperating with them.

A similar focus should be taken on safety policies that integrate other groups, whose needs are overlooked or ignored altogether: lesbians, gays and trans-sexuals for example, who are subject to hate crime, about which there is no public record by the Kosovo police.

<sup>19</sup> See Kosova Women’s Network. Monitoring Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in Kosova/2nd Edition. 2009, p. 60.

**Table 8** Words Associated with Safety by Gender

Security and political institutions, as well as civil society organization, should take a gender perspective on better research and data on crime, by making domestic violence a priority. The outcome of such strategy will be twofold: it will support policies and practices that expand the range of actors involved in the management of safety at the local level, reducing people's sense of vulnerability; and it will also increase the effectiveness of core security institutions such as the police.

By taking an active role in research and implementation of local safety policies tailored to their needs, women and other groups will reverse their victimization, but also shake the local complacency toward crime, with an impact that goes beyond the protection of the most vulnerable. Activities such as corruption and organized crime, widely recognized as threatening to safety and democracy, feed on the passive complicity of local societies and its estrangement from the police. In this and other areas of crime the KP is expected to enhance its insufficient intelligence capabilities, and the success of this objective will be also based on the trust the police will manage to gain at the grassroots, by actively working with all people.<sup>20</sup>

The bet is that a gender perspective on domestic crime will play an analogous role to the one played by a "broken window" approach to the environment and petty crime, by pushing change to a "tipping point"<sup>21</sup> -- in sociological terms, although named after the epidemiological model, this is point at which change spreads as rapidly as a virus.

Back to domestic violence. An effective use of key people - local women and men connected to a wide array of families; information specialists; and charismatic, persuasive leaders --, capable of producing a message that "sticks," could reach the threshold, or the tipping point, for a deep cultural change: the turning of the culture of human rights from the abstract idea of cosmopolitan rhetoric into widespread behavior that defies collective loyalties, when they condone and facilitate crime.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>20</sup> See EULEX Programme Report, especially pp. 34 ff.

<sup>21</sup> See Malcom Gladwell's empirical discussion of tipping points, including the broken window approach and crime reduction in New York City, in *The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference*, Little Brown, 2000.

<sup>22</sup> There is good legislation in Kosovo on domestic violence, from the Kosovo Criminal Code to Protection against Domestic Violence Regulation UNMIK 2003/12, the Law on Family 2004/32. A National Action Plan against Domestic Violence is in the works. Yet, without a deep cultural change, as the above Kosovo Women Network's report explains, the implementation of legislation has been slow.




## Chapter III. From Voluntary Surrender of Weapons to Inclusive Arms Control Strategy

### Weapons Make Society Less Safe

On weapons-related issues and their impact on security, our survey encounters the same apparent contradiction that is observed also in other research.<sup>23</sup> While the attitude of Kosovars toward the possession of weapons is largely negative, and there is a clear perception of weapons as a threat to safety, there is no similar consensus on their voluntary surrender, at least not in the present circumstances. Less a problem than an opportunity, this apparent contradiction directs the efforts of institutions toward further research and a more strategic vision on arms control.

We already saw that a high percentage of respondents consider activities that can be associated with guns – celebratory fire, armed violence, murders and robberies – as a very serious or serious local problem. Almost half say both that owning a firearm should not be allowed (48.1%, Table 9); more than half say that guns create unsafe areas in their municipalities (Table 10, where Serbs are not included because they did not answer). When asked more in general who would benefit the most from arms control measures, more than half consider that a gain for the whole society, an answer that is shared across all ethnic groups.

**Table 9** Should Firearm Possession Be Allowed and When?




Still inconclusive remains an accurate assessment of how large the presence of weapons really is in Kosovo. To date, the 2006 SEESAC's estimate of just above 300,000 illegal weapons in Kosovo remains the conventionally accepted baseline.<sup>24</sup> Its revision will likely not take place before the new legal framework on weapons possession is implemented,<sup>25</sup> when owners will have a chance to register their weapons. Currently, this baseline cannot be corroborated by a comparison with weapons-related crime rates, which are always too low,<sup>26</sup> and as we know, partial and not fully representative of the reality of crime.

<sup>23</sup> See a substantial body of research in FIQ/Saferworld, *Ready or Not?* (July 2009) and other Safeplace publications since 2006, in [www.safeplaceproject.org](http://www.safeplaceproject.org)

<sup>24</sup> See SAWL Survey 2006. According to this estimate, there are 33,949 legal weapons; 42,217 weapons in possession of legal security agencies; and 317,000 illegal weapons.

<sup>25</sup> The Law on Weapons No. 03/L-143 has been approved in November 2009 by the Assembly. A new division of small arms will be established under the Department for Public Security in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Kosovo government also announced its 66th meeting on May 29 2009 that it approved a request from the MIS to initiate procedures on drafting a National Strategy on the Collection of Illegal Weapons as well as a National Strategy and Action Plan on Crime Prevention and Reduction.

<sup>26</sup> In 2007 there were a total of 2120 incidents related to illegal possession of weapons, explosive and ammunition (Annual Report 2007, p. 23), a number consistent with comparable figures in previous years. 4,026 weapons were seized by police in 2004-2005 and 11,406 in the 4 years from the end of the war through 2003 (SAWL Survey 2006, pp. 9-10). Particularly inconclusive would be a comparison with the outcome of the more recent weapons amnesty (2003), which brought in only 155 weapons, a number too low to indicate anything but the unwillingness to surrender illegal weapons. The exception would be the murder rate (3.25 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2007), which is high, although drastically decreased since the end of the war (from 226 murders in 2000 to 65 in 2007).

**Table 10** Perceptions of the Impact of Weapons on Local Societies.

Questions on weapons in general encountered the strongest resistance on the part of respondents and went largely unanswered. From half to three quarters of the respondents either said, “don’t know” or refused to answer any question on weapons ownership. Since possession of unregistered guns is a crime, it is understandable that there would be great reticence in answering direct questions, for fear of self-incrimination or incrimination of friends and neighbors. Whatever the reason behind this stubborn refusal to discuss openly the issue of weapons ownership might be - a refusal consistently appearing in the wealth of surveys on the matter conducted overtime -, does not allow drawing conclusions from survey data.<sup>27</sup>

About our polling on weapons ownership, we can only note that the more indirect the question is, the higher the estimate of weapons. When asked if they know how many households possess firearms, only 4.4% of respondents say that a lot or most of the households do. In a broader assessment of the number of weapons in their municipality or village, 7.5% say that it is high. Asked the same question differently, the answers change. On the estimate of the number of household that don’t have firearms, 19% recognize that every household, most of them, or lots of them, possess firearms.

### ***Why Some Say that Weapons Can be Useful Sometimes.***


A better rate of response was obtained when we asked a general opinion on firearm ownership, and learned that 36.4% think that “it is okay in certain circumstances” to own weapons. A first conclusion is that a significant acceptance of weapons, taken together with the perception of violent crime as a serious problem, indirectly suggests that there is indeed a substantial presence of weapons in the local societies. Not only that, they are there to stay. But for what purpose?

Kosovars certainly do not believe that weapons should be used in a vigilante manner as a protection of the household. Although the family is twice as much associated with a feeling of personal safety than law enforcement or political institutions (Table 11), an overwhelming majority across ethnic groups (66.4%) believes that men should not protect their family with weapons. There is however a small group (10.1%) who thinks otherwise.

<sup>27</sup> Caution should also guide the evaluation of other answers, obtained from only half of the respondents: 9.5% say that the number of weapons is greater than 5 years ago, 33% say no; 29.3% say that there are only pistols, revolvers and hunting rifles, with a small group of 4.1% acknowledging the presence of automatic rifles. Obtaining accurate figures on weapons possession is always a challenge in the absence of official registration reports. This is true in any given society, and usually estimates are based on indirect indicators such as reliable polling, the official gun crime rates (homicides), and the number of weapons either confiscated or voluntarily surrendered. However, the data thus obtained often continue to remain inconclusive and Kosovo is no exception, especially in the context of weak regulation, still awaiting an update ten years after the war. See on this Saferworld, Small Arms Survey 2005, p. 76.

Previous surveys add useful contextual information to help making sense of this partial finding.<sup>28</sup> In April/ May 2008, 29.2% of respondents said that they were ready to acquire a weapon if they were able to and 76.8% of them would have done that in order to protect their family, 21.1% to protect their business. Only 3.7% said that they would use weapons to defend their community and 4.3% in case of conflict or war. Compared to 2006, there was a sharp decline in political motivations for the ownership and use of weapons, but an increase of anxiety about personal safety even in the presence of a strong belief that weapons do not make people any safer.

**Table 11** Words Associated with Feeling of Personal Safety



A second conclusion is that the acceptance of the legal and social norms that are critical of weapons is accompanied by a notion that weapons can be useful in certain circumstances, for example in the presence of a pressing feeling of vulnerability to threats, which must be dealt with privately for lack of better options. This indirectly confirms the already detected worrisome deficit of trust in the institutions that are mandated to ensure safety, and contradicts their general high approval rate.

Although not the focus of this report, a brief mention of state security should be made here. Local societies do not live in isolation, and security at the state level has a deep influence on the sense of safety felt by individuals. For the general sense of safety from political threats, which by and large seems to prevail in Kosovo, to remain prevalent, the new Kosovo Security Force (KSF) and their civilian oversight institutions must establish a relationship of trust with their citizenry. The way in which they will be formed and presented to the public is of paramount importance for their success. Of course, in planning the next *National Security Strategy for Kosovo*, the threat that a large presence of illegal weapons poses to the establishment of the state monopoly of force should be taken into account.


The gap between answers given to more direct or indirect questions on weapons possession reappears in our survey when talking of arms control measures. Participants in focus groups have not felt comfortable in discussing weapons amnesties, although when they do, they agree that the government and the police should sponsor and manage them.<sup>29</sup> In our survey, half of the respondents think the government should be the organizer of a voluntary surrender of illegal weapons, but a little more than half think that the time for that has not come “yet” or “don’t know.” Only 36.5% think that citizens should indeed surrender their

<sup>28</sup> See FIQ/Saferworld, *Through the Cross-Hairs. A Survey of Changing Attitudes towards Small Arms in Kosovo* (November 2008), p. 9ff.

<sup>29</sup> See *Through the Cross-hairs*, *ibid.*, p. 14

weapons (Table 12). This gap is consistent with a broad acceptance of limiting and regulating the presence of guns in the local society, while still thinking that weapons are needed for safety.

**Table 12** Should Citizens Surrender their Weapons?



A third conclusion is thus that a straightforward campaign for voluntary surrender of weapons is the wrong approach to arms monitoring and control. This is consistent with the conclusions reached by recent research on the issue. In the near future, any arms control strategy needs to be based on the broad awareness that those who hold on to their weapons do so because they fear having little control on their lives, in the absence of effective safety policies and institutions. And any strategy also needs to be tailored to varying situations and specific needs.

For a more strategic approach to arms control, a conventional and simplified understanding of Kosovo's "gun culture" needs to be put finally to rest. The portrayal of Kosovo as a place where a strong relation between guns and violence has the essential quality of a long-standing tradition is widely accepted by foreign observers, but also overplayed locally. Yet, it is clear from Kosovo's past and recent history that an appreciation for guns does not automatically translate into violent behavior and that attitudes toward guns vary according to the political and social context.<sup>30</sup>

### **Gender Perspective on Weapons Control**

A more general conclusion on weapons control, also consistent with other research, is that policies must be locally owned at every level of their staging. In the planning as well as implementing phases of any arms control policy, all people should be included as the focus and the actors of a successful strategy. By being inclusive we do not mean fulfilling a checklist of stereotypical subjects, but listening to grassroots needs and aspirations.

For example, traditional male representatives of a putative gun culture and protector of the family might be as elusive as "peace-loving" women. Men are less inclined than women to think that as heads of the households they should be in charge of the security of their families, rather than institutional security providers, or that their sense of safety is based on the family (Tables 7 and 8). Women are believed in general not to own weapons, but we know from other surveys that they are the group that most of all admits

<sup>30</sup> See "'Gun Culture' in Kosovo: Questioning the Origins of Conflict," pp. 205-227 in *Small Arms Survey 2005. Weapons at War. A Project of the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Oxford University Press, 2005.*

readiness to use weapons to defend their families.<sup>31</sup> It is significant in this context that our survey shows that women are considered by a substantial large section of the population (42.8%) part of the decision making process of bringing weapons into the household. Thus, weapons might be viewed property of the household, rather than signifiers of masculinity.

In considering women's participation in an arms control strategy, we need to think about the fact that they are important, but how? Their heightened feeling of vulnerability could make them less supportive of a straightforward voluntary surrender of weapons. Further, it might add to a general sense of insecurity and defenselessness, which currently seems the strongest reason to keep weapons at home.

By contrast, if turned into actors for their own protection and the protection of their families through cooperation with security institutions such as the police, women could have a strong impact in diminishing reliance on the private sphere for safety, and establishing greater sense of local safety and trust. As mentioned above, this goal could be attained by involving women in safety policies specific to their needs first (domestic violence), but also others related to the safety of the household and a judicious use of weapons control. And they should be involved from research and design, to implementation and monitoring.

Expanding the number of local actors managing a weapons control plan through a gender perspective implies the strategic shift in safety policies that we have suggested from the start. It also means changing perspective on other local actors. We found for example that in the eventuality of a campaign for voluntary surrender of weapons, it is to the police that the overwhelming majority would turn (63.9). KFOR is a very distant second (15.1%) among the institutions responsible for collecting the weapons. These answers are rational, given that weapons seizure and stockpiling are the subject matter of police work. They also reflect a wide consensus on the preference of local institutions (the KP) to the international (KFOR). However, they suggest that there is little connection in the mind of Kosovars between municipal councils, law enforcement and safety, as municipalities do not appear at all as possible reference for weapons collection.<sup>32</sup>

This is an area of concern, because local government institutions and agencies are pivotal in providing leadership and services in the most inclusive way. Kosovo municipal governments must urgently correct the perception of their lack of effectiveness and responsibility in the area of local security and take a leadership role together with core security institutions and the citizens.

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<sup>31</sup> See *Ready or Not?*, p. 102: 85% of female respondents v. 66.2% of male respondents say they are concerned mostly about protecting their families.

<sup>32</sup> We already mentioned the failure of the system of financial incentives centered on the municipalities as the focal point for the collection of firearms, established in the 2003 amnesty.

## Chapter IV. Community Policing

### *The Problem with Traditional Law Enforcement*

The Kosovo police consistently enjoy extravagant rates of approval, above 70%.<sup>33</sup> There is general trust in its integrity, confirmed by independent research that finds very low levels of corruption.<sup>34</sup> On people's evaluation of police effectiveness, our survey is also positive, but not to the same extent, although reflecting an improving trend. 34.2% of respondents think that the police are very effective, and the total of those who consider it very effective and somewhat effective is quite high, at 86%.

In a comparison with previous surveys, we find that the number of Kosovars who think that the police can do their job effectively has been increasing.<sup>35</sup> In February 2008, a study on policing showed that 55.6% was either very satisfied or satisfied with the KP's actions in response to crime reporting. In 2007, almost half of the respondents perceived the police as efficient (47.9). Research undertaken in 2006 set these values much lower, with 37.5% of respondents saying that the police are very efficient, or efficient. "Somewhat effective" is slightly less than efficient, but the improvement is evident.

In contrast to this trend, as we mentioned above, indicators such as high underreporting of crime and weapons denote worrisome lack of trust in law enforcement. Focus groups show that basic trust in the police is still accompanied by doubts about its competence and professionalism.<sup>36</sup>

It is possible that police performance still lags behind the growing sense of its effectiveness, because the current police force is relatively young. The KP is the product of the last 9 years of training in the Academy set up by the OSCE after the war, in the context of a complete overhaul of previous law enforcement practices.<sup>37</sup> There is no quick, technical fix to these problems. Some of the best-equipped and resourced police in the world, such as the New York and Los Angeles police, had to change their philosophy of law enforcement (see above) in order to improve their effectiveness.

### *More Tests for State-Builders*

Evidence of performance gaps in the police points to larger problems as well. In 2007, of 2481 criminal cases only 236 were closed with a report, none of them in the major urban areas of Prishtina, Peja or Mitrovica. With 36,000 cases in 2007, the backlog in criminal proceedings is huge. Readiness to report crime and trust the police is influenced by the notion that response to people's victimization is swift, and investigations lead to the apprehension and judgment of offenders.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>33</sup> In April 2009 trust in the police was 74% (EWR No. 24), a level lower than in the first half of 2008 (more than 80%, EWR Special Report No 20-21).

<sup>34</sup> OSCE Report, *Measuring the Trust, Security and Public Safety Perceptions in Kosovo*, 10 June 2008, quoted in OSCE Background Report, *Human Rights, Ethnic Relations and Democracy in Kosovo (Summer 2007-Summer 2008)*, p. 6. According to *Policing in Kosovo*, p. 16, "police are the least likely to receive bribes"; EULEX Programme Report, found that despite low remuneration among lower ranks, there are very few cases of corruption (p. 13).

<sup>35</sup> All the figures are from *Human Security*, p. 29

<sup>36</sup> See *Policing*, pp. 16-17.

<sup>37</sup> The Kosovo Assembly has put in place a good normative framework for the police and for high quality training for all security and public safety agencies (police, customs, corrections, and fire and rescue services). On 20 Feb 2008, as part of the Comprehensive Status Proposal, the Assembly adopted the Law on Police (No. 3/L-035) and the Law on Kosova Police Inspektorate (No. 03/L-036). Both laws came into affect after 15 June 2008. The Law on Police regulates the rights and duties of the police and its organizational structure in line with international policing standards. The Law on Kosova Police Inspektorate establishes an independent institution responsible for overseeing the performance of the police service. The Kosovo Center for Public Safety Education and Development (KCPSED) is located in Vushtrri/Vucitrn, a development of the Police School founded in 1999 by the OSCE Mission in Kosovo. The legal framework for the Center has been in place since March 2008. The OSCE, that monitors the implementation of this legislative framework, found only a few problems, mostly having to do with lack of financial resources.

<sup>38</sup> See EULEX Programme Report for a comprehensive analysis of data quality and police performance.

It is clear that *de facto* and also in people's mind the police do not bear the sole responsibility for problematic levels of performance. In consultative conferences on community safety, "the lack of functioning of the chain between the courts, prosecution and the police" is widely acknowledged as a huge problem in urgent need of solutions.<sup>39</sup> Our survey in fact registers a definite lack of trust in the courts. The perception of their effectiveness in providing security is very low (10%). Kosovars perceive in large part (65,6%) that access to justice is denied to them, with Serbs and Albanians equally sensitive to this problem (respectively 69% and 68%) and only non-Serb groups less dissatisfied (45%). A recent report assessing access to justice confirms the legitimacy of such feelings of dissatisfaction.<sup>40</sup>

In polling research, independent analyses and monitoring reporting, it appears that shortcomings in the rule-of-law and the work of courts are very serious. Major issues are: understaffing of courts; the lack of facilities; the failure to use the criminal procedure code to protect witnesses and apply the law; the violations of the code of ethics, due process and fair trial standards; the huge case backlog in civil proceedings, with 50,000 unsolved cases in 2007; and the extensive flaws in prosecution and trial of inter-ethnic violence and war crimes.<sup>41</sup>

While there is obviously significant room for improvement both in terms of the police effectiveness and its public image, it is the whole field of justice in Kosovo that requires reform. To attain this goal Kosovo's resources are not enough.

Kosovo justice system is as young as the police force. Like the police, in the post-war period it was entrusted to the international administration, but the efforts to reform the Socialist Yugoslav legal and judicial system and create a functioning judiciary have produced mixed results. In particular, as Amnesty International has conspicuously noticed, the international administration is mostly responsible for failings in the prosecution of war crimes. Problems remain, as we mentioned above, at all levels. Local authorities, such as the Ministry of Justice, have been developed only very recently (March 2006), and capacity is still widely considered below accepted international standards.

For the necessary upgrade of the justice system and the police the European Union has established a Rule-of-Law Mission (EULEX), with the mandate of monitoring, mentoring and advising local judges. A system for a timely evaluation of the work of EULEX judges has been set up.<sup>42</sup> As for the timing of the mission's work, the most recent quarterly report to the UN (17 June 2009) states that the mission has become fully operational.<sup>43</sup> What will the impact of this mission be, first on people's sense of safety, second on a tangible improvement of the judiciary, remains to be seen. Much will depend on the effectiveness of the mission; its capacity to meet deadlines that are credible, but also appropriate to the urgent needs for reform; and last, but not least, its ability to convey to the larger public that progress is being made according to publicly stated benchmarks.


<sup>39</sup> FIQ/Saferworld, Community Safety in Kosovo. Conference Summary Report, 12 February, 2009, Grand Hotel Prishtina, p.3.

<sup>40</sup> See UNDP, Assessment Report on Access to Justice in Kosovo, 2008.

<sup>41</sup> See Human Rights, Ethnic Relations and Democracy in Kosovo, pp. 3-6; the OSCE Monthly Legal Monitoring Reports; Amnesty International, Kosovo (Serbia); The Challenge to Fix a Failed UN Justice Mission (January 2008) AI Index: EUR 70/001/2008. Human Rights Watch, Kosovo Criminal Justice Scorecard. Vol. 20, No 2, March 2008. Despite shortcomings, the OSCE finds that there is equanimity of behavior and judgment in the treatment of different ethnic groups. See OSCE Report, Different Communities before the Kosovo Justice System. A Preliminary Statistical Overview of Punishments and Trial Outcomes in District, Municipal, and Minor Offences Courts (December 2008).

<sup>42</sup> See Guidelines on Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising (MMA) of EULEX Judges (23 October 2008). There is a monthly reporting system, from individual judges to the Office of the President of the Assembly of EULEX judges, and a comprehensive report approved by the Assembly, and presented to the Council of the European Union by the Programme Office.

<sup>43</sup> EULEX Report to the UN (17 June 2009)

**Table 13** Importance of Institutions, Laws or Other Actors for Community Safety

Early Warning Reports detected increasing attention to the work of EULEX. As the mission established itself in Kosovo, surveys register a growing approval of its role as well as of its responsibility in Kosovo governance.<sup>44</sup> It is too early to measure trust in this institution, but certainly a skeptic popular attitude, accompanied to the already scant trust in the judicial system and the acknowledgement of lapses in police's work, would not be positive.

### ***The Law and Its Administrators***

Despite lapses in police and courts performance, our survey shows a comforting finding: an overwhelming support for the law and institutions as important for community safety (Table 13). Mayors and Municipal Councils do not rank high among institutions important for community safety, but we must remember that these institutions are very young in the Kosovo political system.

In particular, the figure of the responsible and responsive Mayor has been introduced only with the recent November 2007 elections. Democratically elected Municipal Councils were formed for the first time in 2002, after the November 2001 elections, and only after 2008 they have been given significant more powers and scope of action by the Constitution. It should not surprise that respondents rate institutions, local and national, quite low in the scale of responsibility for local safety (and the local at 8.4% lower than the national 10%) and in the scale of importance - (the Municipal Council 9.3 and the Mayor 6.2, while government 32.7%). Only 18% of respondents thought that Municipal Councils were very effective in providing security.


Yet, the partnership between the Municipal Councils and police received a good rating, indicating that people desire cooperation between security and local government institutions. It is encouraging to learn that this partnership is seen by 37.2% as important for safety; that across ethnic groups there is great desire to support initiatives concerning safer community development other than traditional law enforcement (78.6%), while the gap between this intention and the willingness to participate in them (61.6%

<sup>44</sup> In April 2009, the approval rate for EULEX stood at 39%, an increase of 17 points since October 2008. See EWR No 24.



would take part in it, 26.2% maybe) is not too wide (Table 14). That these initiatives will benefit the whole society is a well-understood outcome (50.3% believe this).

**Table 14** Support for and Participation in Safer Community Development



The questionnaire does not spell out what the specific safety initiatives are, beside police work. A variety of actions can be taken at the local level to address problems relevant to all. In designing such initiatives, it is important to be sensitive to their feasibility, by listening to people’s opinion on what is important for safety. For example, what in some other countries works as the paragon of civic involvement, such as the engagement in religious communities, does not quite correspond to the Kosovo experience. This is reflected in the overwhelmingly low credibility that religious leaders have among citizens in the field of security. There are historical and political reasons for that, and any foreign model of religious engagement would need deep translation in Kosovo.

On the contrary, customary law, considered a pre-modern way of dealing with social and individual conflict, plays a relatively important role, and should not be discounted as a purely negative influence on safety. Customary law is not just about vengeance, but also about mediation and conflict resolution at the very local level of face-to-face communities. Understood in this latter sense, it has played a role in peace campaigns within Kosovo during the 1990w and has been recognized as a powerful example of a self-organized effort at transforming the local society.<sup>45</sup> “Practitioners” of customary law as well as NGOs specialized in conflict resolution should both be involved in safety activities, starting with blood feuds reconciliation, but not only. More in general, a philosophy of mediation and conflict resolution should inspire the behavior of police and other local institutions.

A case in point of the importance of this issue is the finding of a research on Kosovo police performance, which shows how trust in the police and sense of safety increase not just when contacts with officers are frequent, but when they are professional and cordial.<sup>46</sup> When people are not confronted with the arrogance of authority, but meet police capable of listening to people’s problems and finding a way of solving them – the very basic mechanisms of conflict resolution –, trust in the police increase. Equally important, municipal and public administration officials trained in conflict resolution and mediation will improve their relationships with citizens, and lower the tension present in ordinary interactions with authorities. As an example, Partners Kosova’s Local Government Program has increased the transparency and accountability of municipal inspectors, by providing them with the capacity of solving problems before resorting to conflictual personal exchanges or litigation.

<sup>45</sup> See Anton Cetta, “A Future Without Blood Feuds,” pp. 215-233 in *What the Kosovars Say and Demand*. Collection of Studies, Articles, Interviews and Commentaries. Tirana, 1991 and Howard Clark. *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*. Pluto Press, 2000, pp. 137-38.

<sup>46</sup> On the positive impact that the local presence of police, and their behavior with the public, has on perceptions of safety, see *Policing in Kosovo*, pp. 13-14; on support to more police patrolling and more frequent contact with police, see *ibid.*, p. 21.

The discussion that we have been developing so far confirms what is already well known in policing research and best practices, which increasingly focus on community policing. Here, the balance of traditional law enforcement with citizens' engagement and partnership is paramount. In Kosovo there is much that can be done locally, and without a great injection of resources, in order to improve the effectiveness of the police and translate the general approval of the service into concrete trust. A general redirection of police operations toward community policing will build a great reservoir of trust.

## ***Understandings of Community***

Kosovo should be well on its way to make community policing a widespread practice. Foreseen in the Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan, community policing has received strong international support. Experts drafted a Kosovo strategy in 2005. Structures within the police are in place: the Department of Community Policing, with a small HQ Community Policing Unit since September 2007, and training at the KCPSED, with basic and advanced community policing courses.<sup>47</sup>

The state of play of community policing is more complex than this picture. The first comprehensive analysis of the Kosovo police conducted by the monitoring and advising EULEX mission makes just a quick review of the central Community Policing Unit performance. It finds the Unit small, but satisfactory, though lacking even a vehicle; it takes notice of poor planning capacity.<sup>48</sup> An extraordinary inspection of compliance with Section 7 (Relations with the community) of UNMIK Regulation 2005/54, conducted by the Police Inspectorate, focuses mostly on the modalities of the Station Commanders appointments; it also finds that local police are lacking in planning and reporting capacity.<sup>49</sup> Training might be a problem, if in 2007 only 49 of the 7076 police currently in service attended community-policing courses. Finally, a review of the field shows that community policing began to be implemented, through specific programs supported by international organizations, only in a number of municipalities.<sup>50</sup>

Community policing does not seem to be a priority for police work or reform, although it is clear from what we have been discussing so far that Kosovo has the urgent need for a pro-active, participatory law enforcement approach and that it must be an agency-wide philosophy and practice in order to produce results.

In fact, despite the institutional setting in place, and the encouraging signs that people are willing to participate in safety initiatives different from traditional reactive policing, community policing implementation seems to be slow and haphazard. There is little clarity on what this approach implies. What does it all mean in practice? What do we mean by community? What kind of activities are citizens, as individuals or groups, expected to participate in? What is the role of mayors and municipal institutions?

In the parlance of research and practice, community policing means very simply a shift from traditional reactive law enforcement to prevention; problem solving focused on the causes of crime; and partnerships with local organizations and the citizens themselves in order to identify and address problems. Its

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<sup>47</sup> See Annual Report 2007, p. 18 and 35, where information on the Department work during 2007 is brief and too generic.

<sup>48</sup> See EULEX Programme Report, p. 50-51. A brief mention of EULEX community policing is made in reference to patrolling (p. 47), for a total of 3 pages in a 150-page document.

<sup>49</sup> The Police Inspectorate of Kosovo, Ministry of Internal Affairs. Annual Report 2007. A Detailed Report on Police Performance (2008), pp. 47-56. The focus of the inspection was mostly on the appointment of Station Commanders and related matters. It found that the consultative prerogatives of Municipal Community Safety Council (MCSC) on the selection of the commanders were respected.

<sup>50</sup> In Gernove (Viti) the program is run by FIQ for Saferworld: see Balkan Youth Union, Center for Security Studies, Civil, Forum for Civic Initiative and Saferworld. Creating Safer Communities. Lessons from South Eastern Europe, December 2006, pp. 22-28. In 20 municipalities across Kosovo, the program is based on Community Safety Action Teams created and administered through a bilateral partnership between the United States Department of Justice International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and the OSCE Mission in Kosovo Department of Public Safety: see OSCE, Assessing the Impact. Kosovo's Community Safety Action Teams (March 2009). In 2009 Kosovo Small Arms Control Initiative (KOSSAC) rolled out with a Safer Community Initiative in 6 Municipalities in cooperation with ICITAP and the OSCE.


implementation occurs in small-scale societies –neighborhoods of larger towns or villages – because it is predicated on close, personal interactions. The term community here takes the meaning of a diversified group, sharing concerns that are determined by commonalities and vicinity.

A first issue to be considered is that in Kosovo, beside the ordinary meaning of a group sharing something in common, the term ‘community’ is also loaded with the extra meaning of ethnicity. Art. 57.1 of the Constitution spells out the meaning of “Communities:” “Inhabitants belonging to the same national or ethnic, linguistic, or religious group traditionally present on the territory of the Republic of Kosovo.” The Minister of Communities and Returns (MCR) has the mandate of promoting and protecting the rights of Communities and their members, including the right of return. Everyone understands that the Minister, usually a Serb citizen, has the responsibility for the protection of ethnic minorities.<sup>51</sup> Communities is widely used in ordinary speech to mean ethnic minorities or non-Albanians, including Serbs, Roma, Egyptians, Ashkali, Turks, Bosniaks, Gorani and Croats.

This usage complicates understanding of community policing, especially the establishment of local safety structures. Under Section 7 of UNMIK Regulation 2005/54, which is titled “Relations with the community,” Municipal Community Safety Councils (MCSCs) are envisioned to ensure that the police “cooperate fully with municipal authorities and with representatives of Communities to enhance the security of members of all Communities within each municipality.”<sup>52</sup> In this text, the Councils must include the Mayor, the Police Station Commander, and representatives of Communities, intended as ethnic groups. A subsequent Administrative Instruction expands the composition to representatives of religious communities, Local Public Safety Committees (LPSCs), Community Safety Action Teams (CSATs), the municipal civilian emergency sector, and the civil society – youth and women groups, media, the business community, and NGOs of non-majority communities.<sup>53</sup>

The constant semantic shift from “community” to “Communities” is relevant to our discussion. In fact, from our survey we derive a complex picture of the understanding of community among ordinary Kosovars that reflects these multiple, shaded connotations of the term (Table 15). Serbs are much more likely to associate community with people sharing common problems or from the same local societies. Albanians instead, although aware of a broader meaning of community,<sup>54</sup> largely reduce commonality to the ascribed statutes of ethnicity and nationality. (Though nationality is a reversible status, in this context its meaning is very close to ethnicity). This is even truer for other non-Serb groups.

**Table 15** Understanding of the Term Community



<sup>51</sup> A good presentation of this discussion is in: <http://www.ecmikosovo.org/fileadmin/ecmikosovo.tpl/communities.html>

<sup>52</sup> UNMIK Regulation 2005/54, On the Framework and Guiding Principles of the Kosovo Police Service.

<sup>53</sup> Administrative Instruction No 08/2009 MIA- 02/2009 MLGA For Municipal Community Safety Councils, Art. 5

<sup>54</sup> In Albanian, community is both bashkësi, having something in common, or communal society of artists for example, and komunitet, community of drug dependents, women, students, etc.

This split should be carefully analyzed and here we can offer only some suggestions. A strong identification of community with ethnicity is shared by the Albanian majority and the smallest minorities. This type of association is puzzling. It could be the reflection of the fact that the term community as ethnic minority is common currency in Kosovo, as we explained above. But it also expresses defensive homogenization, which can be attributed to the discrimination and marginalization that are specific to the condition of minorities. This in fact could be the reason why Serbs are much less inclined to assimilate their sense of community with ethnicity or a nationality, which in the context of Kosovo, and separately from Serbia, might be tantamount to admit that they are a minority.

But why Albanians, as the majority, should partake in this defensiveness? A possible answer is found in the not so distant history of Kosovo. Already in the 1980s, and continuing through the post-war period, surveys have revealed two consistent trends: a very high social distance between Albanians and other groups, with the highest between Albanians and Serbs;<sup>55</sup> and the enduring labeling of Albanians as ethnocentric and backward.<sup>56</sup> In the 1990s, the repressive policies of Milosevic and the ensuing war strengthened the ethnic homogenization of Albanians, increasing their distance from other groups.

Our survey confirms that the impact of Kosovo troubled history is still apparent if Albanians, at least in general surveys, continue to present a homogenized front as an ethnic community. Any other conclusion to be drawn from answers on a series of indicators of social distance is problematic. For example, it is impossible to compare findings on the acceptance of ethnic groups other than one's own as fellow citizens, because Serbs and Albanians understand "my country" as two different entities.<sup>57</sup>

## **Implementing Community Policing**

What is important for our purposes is this: for the majority of Kosovars, community does not have a civic connotation and any campaign to design, promote and implement community policing and community safety policies should take this fact into account. The focus of a full implementation of community policing should be less on "community" and more on local societies, problem solving and local partnerships.

This realization has bearing for the work of local safety structures such as MCSCs and LPSCs. To date, there are MCSCs in all 30 municipalities and LPSCs in 15 villages. Yet, surveys show that there is only marginal public awareness of their existence: in 2007, 12.3% had heard of LPSCs and 15.8% of MCSCs.<sup>58</sup> Our survey only very indirectly provides some more information, because the question was, more generally, on awareness of any activity in the field of community safety besides police activities: 28% said yes, 36% not at all, and 35.8% said don't know or refused to answer. This finding casts doubts on the working of safety institutions that are supposed to be closer to the people in small-scale societies.

We mentioned already two reasons that might account for the problems that these Councils encountered in their implementation: the police have poor planning capacity, and strong Mayors are completely new figures in Kosovo. One further suggestion is that the inconsistent use of the term "community(ies)" might be reflected in a practical inconsistency of policies and operation. In other words, if these local councils are understood and function as committees with a focus on communities, they will face serious obstacles in the implementation of community policing. Keeping in mind what we learned on ethnic distance,

<sup>55</sup> See Izvestaj Nezavisne Komisije, *Kosovski Cvor: Dresiti Ili Seci?* Biblioteka Kronos, 1990, p. 133. This trend continued in the post war period. See UNDP, *The Challenges of Social Cohesion. Report No 2 (Serbia) of the Early Warning System for FRY*, November 2000, pp. 19-22; and UNDP, *Suspended Transition, 0 Edition (Serbia) of the Early Warning System for FRY* January 2001, p. 26, where a comparison of surveys taken in 1993-1996 and 2000 shows that the distance between Serbs and Albanians was the highest and did not change at all.

<sup>56</sup> *Kosovski Cvor*, *ibid.*, p. 138; and poll from Forum for Ethnic Relations and Institute for Philosophy and Sociology of Prishtina, published in S. Mihailovic, "Ethnicki stereotipi heterostereotipi na Kosovu," *Sociologija*, LX, 3 (1998) p. 411

<sup>57</sup> We must note here that there is a high percentage of Albanians (37.1%) who would not accept Serbs as citizens of Kosovo, and an even higher percentage who would exclude them altogether, even as visitors (44%).

<sup>58</sup> *Policing*, *ibid.*, p. 22 *Human Security*, *ibid.*, p. 34

community as ethnicity is a ground for separation and impedes rather than facilitate the unity of purpose necessary to solve shared problems.

There is no need to start from scratch to help MCSCs and LPCs become functioning structures of community policing. The quinquennial experience of Community Safety Action Teams (CSATs) - groups of representative local leaders in government, society and police, trained in community policing -, has already proven that a focus on problems solving in the areas of major importance for the public can produce progress in local safety; trust in law enforcement; and improvement in ethnic relations.

An assessment of the CSATs work in support of MLSCs identified traffic safety and the environment as the areas where there has been greatest success. In one instructive example, by building sidewalks, and increasing the number of traffic signs and streetlights, a cooperative effort of local institutions and civil society created a safer space for all in the community of Kamenica. In the context of this environmental reshaping, a negotiation on removing barriers between local Albanian and Serbian neighborhoods, the focus of intervention on Communities, also managed to succeed.

The rewards of community policing, through the establishment of a stronger civic sense of community, are tangible. For example, the CSATs' assessment reveals that in community policing activities there are higher percentages of inter-ethnic exchange and availability to exchange than shown in general surveys.<sup>59</sup> Frequency of contacts around problem solving activities of public interest offsets the rather negative outcome registered in questions related to social distance.

CSATs have also improved relationships between the police and the community not only on concrete projects, but also increasing the frequencies of encounters. Two thirds of people who participated in the assessment said that crime was down, though this is only true in 9 out of 16 municipalities involved (for the remaining the crime rate has gone up).<sup>60</sup> But the reason for this gap between perception and reality might be that thanks to CSATs' activities levels of crime reporting went up as well in those 9 municipalities, indicating greater trust in law enforcement.

The lesson of the experiences mentioned above should not be lost. It confirms the classic notion that a "defensible space" can be organized at the very local level in the following way: by adopting an appropriate spatial configuration, ensuring that the residents are responsible for the control of their territory, and the police works according to local needs.<sup>61</sup> Common sense also helps: a better sense of security can be attained by increasing the number of street lights, for example, if half of those who claim to feel unsafe most of the times do so especially at night (49.5%).

The role of the Mayor and Municipal Councils is obviously very important in this context, beyond their institutional the right of consultation on the appointment of the police Station Commander. Mayors and their Municipalities constantly interact with local groups and associations. They can promote partnerships with them, establish better coordination, and bring in the necessary resources. They can also coordinate the work of government agencies, whose intervention is needed on specific issues.

Mayors can provide leadership to other public service officials to be more active in their work. They can use the same leadership qualities to encourage the participation of important sections of the community, such as businesses and media. Most importantly, Mayors and Municipalities must ensure that the issues addressed are relevant to all and not to the strongest, or the best lobbyists for their own cause. Their support will have great implication for vulnerable groups and their problems, women and domestic violence for example, or embattled minorities and their rights.

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<sup>59</sup> Assessing the Impact, *ibid.*, p. 44

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 50

<sup>61</sup> See Oscar Newman, *Defensible Space. Crime Prevention Through Urban Design*. Collier Books, 1973.

## Chapter V. Kosovo Serbs

### Enduring Feeling of Insecurity

Gauging the perception of local safety, and the effectiveness of security institutions among Kosovo Serbs requires a serious consideration of a few problems that complicate the reading of survey data.

First, more often than not Serbs' understanding and reality of central and local government, police, and courts, is different from the rest of the population; sometimes, it is different across Serbian settlements.


Second, on certain questions Serbs do not answer at all or answer in such low numbers to invalidate the statistical significance of the data. As a consequence, comparisons with other ethnic groups and conclusion about partial or confusing data demand great caution. Almost impossible is to gauge the attitude of Serbs toward weapons, the possession of weapons, and arms control strategies, as they refuse to answer questions on this topic. For example, about half agree on the need to voluntarily surrender weapons, but as many do not answer the question. Any conclusion on very partial data would be too speculative.

One clear outcome of our survey is that Serbs are more likely to feel unsafe or very unsafe in their own municipalities (Table 3).

In the regions of Prishtina, Ferizaj and Gjilan, Kosovo Serbs live in mixed municipalities, or villages/enclaves surrounded by Albanians, while in Mitrovica they are the overwhelming majority, with small pockets of minorities. Since these regions are quite different, it would be interesting to inquire more in depth what are the reasons for such feeling of insecurity.

What is noticeable is that Mitrovica is perceived as the most unsafe region, and not only by Serbs (Table 16). Mitrovica and northern Kosovo have been a highly volatile, border region since the end of the 1999 NATO bombing campaign. The politically motivated violence that has characterized this area since February 2008 has added to a heightened sense of insecurity already present. The latest Humanitarian Law Center report on security and human rights in Mitrovica points to a tense situation, with members of all groups feeling unsafe. This is consistent with our survey, which shows that in Mitrovica, Serbs and non-Serbs are equally concerned about safety.


**Table 16\*** Perception of Unsafe Municipalities by Region and Ethnicity



\*There are no Serb respondents from Prizren, Peja, and Gjakova

Kosovo Serbs identify inter-ethnic problems as a local concern more than any other group (53.5% of them, v. 22% of Albanians and 42.5 of others). But in large part they are concerned about the same issues as everybody else, from economic and environmental problems to crime, in this order (Table 17).

**Table 17\*** Perception of Problems and Serious Problems in Municipalities/Villages among Kosovo Serbs



[\*On armed violence half of the respondents do no answer. Issues such as vandalism, celebratory fire, blood feuds, prostitution, and violence in school receive less then 1 point].

This finding suggests that the conclusions on local safety policies, which were derived from a discussion on Kosovo in general, could apply to municipalities where Serbs are a majority as well.

Still missing is reliable information on Serbs' perception of the effectiveness of local security and political institutions. They largely don't answer questions on the role of Municipal Councils and Mayors in ensuring local safety, as well as on the effectiveness of a police-Municipal Councils partnership. Almost half of respondents say that the state is responsible for a feeling of personal safety, but this suggests more a lack of confidence in the Kosovo institutions than the opposite, since Kosovo Serbs only recognize the state of Serbia.

### **Local Safety Strategies to Strengthen the Option of Voice over Exit**

After February 2008, the stalemate between the Kosovo and Serbia on the issue of Kosovo's independence apparently left the local Serbian population with "exit" (one of Hirschman's useful designations of political behavior) as the only option.<sup>62</sup> Serbs live largely separate lives through parallel administrative institutions, which in northern Kosovo, a territory contiguous with Serbia and more ethnically homogeneous in their favor, are also political. South of the Ibar, where they live in mixed societies, parallel institutions are not as present, and Serbs interact more with Kosovo institutions for pragmatic reasons. Thus, the reality is more a mix of "exit" and a weak version of "voice." This latter option might strengthen, when new Serbian municipalities with expanded powers, under Kosovo's decentralization plan, are implemented.<sup>63</sup>

The last time Kosovo Serbs voted was on the occasion of the Serbian Municipal elections, held in May 2008 in all Kosovo municipalities where the Serb population is a majority, but declared illegal by the Spe-

<sup>62</sup> See HLC, Ethnic Communities in Kosovo 2007 and 2008 on the major influence that the Government of Serbia has on the boycott of Kosovo's institutions. (p. 187-188).

<sup>63</sup> On the political and social conditions in which Kosovo Serbs currently live see ICG, Serbs Integration in Kosovo: Taking the Plunge, Europe Report No 200 (12 May 2009) and KIPRED, Kosovo at a Crossroads: Decentralization and the Creation of New Municipalities (July 2009).

cial Representative of the Secretary General. Serbs had boycotted the November 2007 Kosovo elections, which simultaneously chose the Assembly, the Municipal Councils, and for the first time through direct elections, the Mayors.


Thus, the institutions that currently govern the lives of Serbs, beside the Serbian Minister for Kosovo and Metohija and the government of Serbia, have a unique status: the people and Serbia recognize them as legitimate, but the Kosovo Republic and international organizations do not. Kosovo Serbs in turn do not recognize Kosovo institutions. It is not surprising that Serbs and the rest of the population understand general questions on institutions' responsibility and responsiveness to Kosovo citizens differently. Some of these questions do not even apply.

When more Serb respondents than others say that they are aware of safety initiatives at the community level, and ready to support and actively participate in them, it is not clear what they mean by that. But being *de jure* and *de facto* detached from the institutions of the Kosovo and some of the international institutions established after February 2008 – EULEX and the International Civilian Office (ICO) for example –, it is understandable that they would look to safety strategies and practices that are alternative to the institutional ones.

The character of these local safety strategies and practices – whether they will be cooperative or not with the larger society – will much depend on the decision about participating or boycotting the next Kosovo local elections, to be held in November 2009 and moving ahead with the decentralization plan. Without discounting the difficulties created by the general political background, even partial survey data suggest that there is an opportunity to shift Serbs' attitudes from a monolithic "exit" to strengthening the option of "voice." If Kosovo Serbs consider the very local space as the main theatre to ensure safety, in the absence of trust in Kosovo's institutions, the challenge is to facilitate civic initiatives over a focus on ethnic separation.

Let's take the case of the police, which in all surveys traditionally obtains exaggeratedly low levels of general approval among the Serb population, remaining at a constant low of 2%.<sup>64</sup> In our survey the police is not strongly associated to a feeling of personal safety but is considered by 38% of the Serb respondents the security provider, and by 65.7% very effective or somewhat effective in ensuring local safety. Serbs are more inclined to report crimes or incidents to the police than Albanians (62.8% v. 52.3%).

**Table 18** Perception of Problems and Serious Problems in Municipalities/Villages among Kosovo Serbs



To explain this gap in perceptions one must understand first that it is the state of Serbia that is strongly associated to safety, and that it is the government of Kosovo that is not seen at all as a security provider. The Kosovo police on the other hand is considered a security provider because can count on a substantial presence of Serb officers, stationed in Municipalities where the majority of the population is Serbian.

<sup>64</sup> See EWR No. 24



Generally seen with contempt as a symbol of a new state that lacks recognition among Serbs, in practice the police are also seen as serving local societies in a largely satisfactory manner. This leaves room for building even better relationships with this local security institution.

Granted, in northern Kosovo a unique arrangement has left the local police under direct UNMIK police command. This has allowed continuity even after the declaration of Kosovo independence in February 2008, when the 259 Serb officers stayed at their posts, differently from a large section of their colleagues south of the river Ibar. However, some ethnically mixed stations, such as Strpce and Peja were not affected by the boycott.<sup>65</sup>

In the context of detachment from Kosovo political and administrative institutions, reliance on Kosovo police is possible for Serbs in municipalities where Serbs live, if there is an acceptable level of local control. The decentralization plan offers exactly the opportunity to establish the strongest possible self-government within Kosovo. This will clear the decks from the confusing institutional and political life in which Serbs currently live and allow the formation of local governments that represent the community and can contribute to strengthen its security.

## Conclusions

Kosovo is a post-conflict society, governed by a complex mix of indigenous and international institutions and, after its declaration on independence in 2008, with an unresolved relationship with Serbia. Perceptions of security and insecurity among its population have been and are influenced by broader political issues that cannot be addressed only locally.

Yet, it is at the very local level of villages and towns that safety, or lack of safety, is normally experienced and negotiated. Because of an historical legacy of alienation from the state, in Kosovo this has traditionally meant an over reliance on private security systems, whether based on family or contracted out to security professionals. Private security, based on communal allegiances, has tended to compensate for lack of trust in core security institutions such as the police and the courts, and has both reflected and reinforced the division of society in conflicting groups.

Overcoming this legacy of conflict is a crucial test for Kosovo, which is required to fulfill standards of rule of law, since it aspires to European integration. To achieve this goal, safety must become as a public good in the classic sense of the term. This means that local safety must retain all its value while enjoyed by everyone, and without excluding anyone. In other words, it must be both produced and consumed by everyone. The good news, from the survey data examined for this report, is a new willingness on the part of citizens to participate in safety initiatives. But it is the government – all levels of it, though especially local government – that must take the lead together with the police.

The new Mayors with enhanced powers, as well as the local safety committees – both at village and municipality levels – are key. The direction that they should follow is also clear. From best practices around the world, it is well known that taking human security and community policing seriously – or “putting people first” - is the approach to local safety that works most successfully. In Kosovo, like elsewhere, research that listens to local concerns lays the ground for translating this general direction and its slogans into pro-active safety strategies.

In order to design and implement safety strategies that address people’s safety concerns, a variety of local actors need to be engaged. Among the most important: the local government leadership, law enforce-

<sup>65</sup> In August 2008, following their boycott of local police structures, 287 Serb officers (out of 430 Serb officers south of the Ibar), were suspended with pay. See OSCE Report, Human Rights, Ethnic Relations and Democracy in Kosovo (Summer 2007-Summer 2008).

ment, associations, health providers, schools, businesses, media, and non-profit. Broad partnerships at the local level are necessary to tackle both crime and the quality of life problems affecting the local society. They also help overcome the deficit trust from which Kosovo law enforcement and other local and central institutions still suffer.

None of this is completely new for Kosovo. Experiences of community policing already in place, mentioned in this report, show how the policy works and present a model of best practices rooted in the local space. Once again, what is needed is leadership, both at the central and local levels, to make the leap from theory to practice, and from pilot experiences to Kosovo-wide policies.

Much will depend on the capacity of law enforcement to know and understand crime patterns in order to prevent them, as well as adopt community policing across departments; on the ability of local governments to lead, both in managing a better delivery of public services, and in promoting and sustaining safety initiatives; on the effectiveness of the international support (EULEX) that is embedded in the judiciary and police; and on the engagement of grassroots organizations, without which there will be no democratic control over safety strategies.

This report makes a few practical recommendations, in the belief that the local level is the ground where a civic community of shared concerns can emerge. Vulnerable groups, such as women and ethnic minorities, will find there the opportunity to raise their voice, defend their rights, and in this process make their societies more democratic. A case in point is a strong approach to fighting domestic violence. This offers a good example of how can the public sphere interact with the private, and institutions with grassroots, breaking a local complacency with crime that is founded on communal allegiances, mistrust of institutions and, inevitably, fear.



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